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Abstract
This paper analyzes the timing options embedded in a startup firm, and the associated
market entry and exit timing decisions under the exogenous risks of early termination and
competitor’s entry. Our valuation approach leads to the analytical study of a non-standard
perpetual American installment option nested with an optimal sequential stopping problem.
Explicit formulas are derived for the firm’s value functions. Analytically and numerically, we
show that early termination risk leads to earlier voluntary entry or exit, and the threat of
competition has a non-trivial effect on the firm’s entry and abandonment strategies.
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, there have been a number of highly successful startup companies.
Nevertheless, in general firms in their early stages require significant capital investment for research
and development (R&D) and face tremendous amount risk that may force them to abandon the
projects. Many startups may fail before they even sell a single unit of products. The risk of early
termination may be due to demand uncertainty, technological challenges, regulatory changes, and
other causes.
Another major risk factor for a startup is the emergence of a competitor. This is commonly seen
in markets with very few major players, for example, Lyft’s entry to New York City to compete with
Uber,1 and the launch of Apple music to rival Pandora and Spotify.2 In effect, new competition may
reduce the existing firm’s market share and thus revenue stream, as noted by Petersen and Bason
(2001). In turn, this influences how long the firm can stay in the market.
In this paper, we propose a theoretical real option approach to better understand a startup
firm’s strategies to voluntarily abandon a project or enter the market in face of early termination
and competition risks. The arrivals of early termination and competition are modeled by exogenous
independent exponential random variables. We analyze their combined impact on the firm’s optimal
timing to enter or exit. Our valuation approach is a non-standard perpetual American installment
option nested with an optimal sequential stopping problem.
Our main results are the analytic solutions for the firm’s sequential timing problems. We also
investigate the impact of the early termination risk and the competitor’s potential entry on the
firm’s value and the associated timing to enter and exit the market. Among our findings, the
firm has a lower entry threshold and higher cancellation threshold when the early termination risk
rises. On the other hand, competition risk may increase or decrease the firm’s abandonment level,
depending on the impact on the new cash flow. We provide the necessary and sufficient condition
for both cases. Numerical results are provided to illustrate these effects.
In the literature, Pennings and Lint (1997) study the empirical option value of an R&D project,
and model the arrivals of new information that impact cash flows by exponential random vari-
ables. Lukas et al. (2016) propose an entrepreneurial venture financing model without compe-
tition risk by combining compound option pricing with sequential non-cooperative contracting.
Kort and Wrzaczek (2015) apply a game-theoretic approach to study the incumbent’s over or under
investment problem accounting for the threat of entry. Also, Restrepo et al. (2015) study a real op-
tion approach for sequential investments in the presence of expropriation risk. Davis et al. (2004)
study the valuation of a venture capital as an installment option, while Ciurlia and Caperdoni
(2009) and Kimura (2009) study the pricing of American installment put and call options. Our
model can be viewed as a perpetual American-style installment compound option with three stop-
ping times. The incubation period in our model is similar to the time-to-build in infrastructure
investments, which also involves a timing option to start operation; see Dahlgren and Leung (2015).
Kwon (2010) studies the firm’s decision to discard or invest in an aging technology with a declin-
ing profit stream with demand uncertainty. The theory of optimal stopping is applied to study
project management with uncertain completion in Chi et al. (1997), and to develop strategies for
drug discovery in Zhao and Chen (2009), among others. Sequential stopping problems also arise in
other applications, such as participating a government subsidized program (Huisman and Thijssen
(2013)), and trading under mean reversion (Leung and Li (2015a,b)).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the firm’s investment timing
problems, and present our formulation. Then, we present the solutions of the optimal abandonment
1http://www.wsj.com/articles/lyft-revs-up-in-new-york-city-1448038672
2http://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-to-announce-new-music-services-1433183201
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timing problem in Section 3, and the optimal entry timing problem in Section 4. In Section 5, we
examine the effects of the early termination risk and competitor’s entry on the firm’s strategies.
Section 6 concludes. All proofs are included in the Appendix.
2 Problem Formulation
In the background, we fix a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P). The firm’s valuation is con-
ducted under the historical probability measure P, with a subjective discount rate ρ > 0, as in
McDonald and Siegel (1986). We consider a startup firm that can enter a targeted market and
generate a stochastic cash flow until the firm’s voluntary abandonment time. We assume that the
firm acts as a price taker in this market. The cash flow is driven by a stochastic factor X, satisfying
dXt = µXt dt+ σXt dBt, (2.1)
with drift µ > 0 and volatility σ > 0. For instance, we can interpret X as the prevailing market
price of the goods/services sold by the firm. Let F = (Ft)t≥0 be the filtration generated by X, and
T be the set of all stopping times with respect to F.
The firm seeks to maximize its net present value (NPV) by selecting the best time to enter the
market. Prior to the entry, as depicted by Figure 1(a), the firm can cancel the project at time τc
(bottom path), or is forced to abort the project due to early termination risk at time ζ1 (middle
path) during this incubation period. If either event occurs, the firm stops operation and generates
no future cash flow. In the third scenario (top path), the firm avoids early termination and opts to
enter the market at time τe.
Figure 1(b) illustrates the scenarios after market entry. Given that the firm has entered the
market, the firm can abandon the project before or after the competitor’s arrival time ζ2. In these
two possible situations, the firm’s abandonment decision with or without competition, represented
by the thresholds a˜ and a respectively, can be different. For instance, the firm may have a higher
abandonment threshold if there is competition in the market, i.e. a˜ > a (top and bottom paths).
As such, the firm will stay in the market even when the price X is below a˜ but above a before the
competitor arrives. In this case, as soon as the competitor enters suddenly at time ζ2, the firm’s
abandonment level switches to the higher level a˜ above the current value of X, forcing the firm to
abandon immediately (middle path). The random times involved in our model are summarized in
Table 1.
Random times Description
τc Firm’s cancellation time to forgo market entry
τe Firm’s entry time
τa Firm’s abandonment time after market entry without new competition
τ˜a Firm’s abandonment time after competitor’s entry
ζ1 Exogenous early termination time during the incubation period
ζ2 Competitor’s exogenous arrival time after the firm’s entry
Table 1: Summary of the random times in our model. The early termination time ζ1 and the
competitor’s arrival time ζ2 are exogenous and assumed to be independent exponential random
variables.
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Time tζ1τeτc0
Cancellation
Hold
Market entry
Price Xt
e
X0
c
Xτe
Xτc
Xζ1
(a) Pre-entry period.
Price Xt
Time tζ2τe τa τ˜a
a
a˜
Hold
Abandon with
competition
Abandon without
competition
Xτe
Xτa
Xτ˜a
Xζ2
(b) Post-entry period.
Figure 1: All possible scenarios for the firm in the pre-entry and post-entry periods.
To formulate the firm’s timing problems, we first consider the scenario with a competition in
the market post-entry period. In this case, we specify the profit stream by (g (Xt))t≥0. Our model
assumes a linear function: g(x) = αx−β for all x > 0, where 0 < α ≤ 1, β > 0. We can interpret the
fraction α as a reduction in revenue, and β as the fixed cost when the firm faces new competition.
In addition, let τ˜a be the abandonment time after the competitor’s entry. To maximize its net
present value (NPV), the firm solves the optimal stopping problem
V˜ (x) = sup
τ˜a∈T
Ex
[∫ τ˜a
0
e−ρtg (Xt) dt
]
, (2.2)
where Ex[ · ] ≡ E[ · |X0 = x].
When the firm first enters the market, it generates a profit stream (f (Xt))t≥0, where we assume
f(x) = x−K for all x > 0, where K > 0 represents the fixed cost. Then the firm operates till the
abandonment time τa when facing no new competition. If the competitor arrives at ζ2 (before the
firm’s abandonment), then the firm’s NPV is exactly V˜ (x) (see (2.2)). In other words, the firm will
continue to generate the profit stream g from time ζ2 on, after having accumulated the profit stream
f up to ζ2. We assume that ζ2 is an exponential random variable with parameter λ2, independent
of price process (Xt)t≥0. Therefore, before new competition arrives, the firm’s maximized NPV is
V (x) = sup
τa∈T
Ex
[∫ τa∧ζ2
0
e−ρtf (Xt) dt+ 1{τa>ζ2}e
−ρζ2 V˜ (Xζ2)
]
= sup
τa∈T
Ex
[∫ τa
0
e−(ρ+λ2)t
(
f (Xt) + λ2V˜ (Xt)
)
dt
]
, (2.3)
which follows from the distribution of ζ2 and law of iterated expectations. The derivation is provided
in the Appendix A.1. As we can see, the value function in (2.2) becomes an input to the firm’s
value function V in (2.3).
During the incubation period, the firm has to pay the operating cost c(Xt) over time. For
simplicity, we let c(x) = ax+b for all x > 0, with constants a, b > 0. The firm may choose to cancel
the project at time τc, but could end up terminating it early at the exogenous time ζ1, which is an
exponential random variable with parameter λ1, independent of price process (Xt)t≥0 and ζ2. If
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the firm avoids cancellation and termination, then it will enter the market at time τe. Therefore,
the firm’s pre-entry value function is given by
ψ(x) = sup
τe,τc∈T
Ex
[
−
∫ τe∧τc∧ζ1
0
e−ρtc(Xt) dt+ 1{τc∧ζ1>τe}e
−ρτeV (Xτe)
]
= sup
τe,τc∈T
Ex
[
−
∫ τe∧τc
0
e−(ρ+λ1)tc(Xt) dt+ 1{τc>τe}e
−(ρ+λ1)τeV (Xτe)
]
. (2.4)
The last step (2.4) is derived similarly to (2.3); see Appendix A.1.
In summary, we seek to solve for the value functions {V˜ , V, ψ} and the associated optimal timing
strategies {τ˜∗a , τ
∗
a , τ
∗
c , τ
∗
e }. As seen in (2.2)-(2.4), the firm’s post-entry strategy and new competition
can affect its pre-entry decisions.
3 Optimal Abandonment Timing Problem
We first analyze the firm’s exit problem represented by V˜ (x) in (2.2). If ρ ≤ µ, then we have
V˜ (x) ≥ Ex
[∫ +∞
0
e−ρtg (Xt) dt
]
≥ α
∫ +∞
0
e−ρtEx [Xt] dt−
β
ρ
= +∞. (3.1)
The last equality holds due to Ex(Xt) = xe
µt and µ ≥ ρ. As a result, it is optimal for the firm to
never exit the market if ρ ≤ µ, with an infinite NPV.
Therefore, in the rest of the paper, we consider the non-trivial case ρ > µ. To facilitate our
presentation, we define the constants
hi(λ) =
1
σ2
(
σ2
2
− µ+ (−1)i
√
(
σ2
2
− µ)2 + 2σ2(ρ+ λ)
)
, i ∈ {1, 2} , λ ≥ 0. (3.2)
Proposition 3.1. After the competitor’s arrival, the firm’s value function defined in (2.2) is given
by
V˜ (x) =
{
− α
k1(ρ−µ)
(a˜∗)1−k1xk1 + α
ρ−µx−
β
ρ
if x > a˜∗,
0 if 0 < x ≤ a˜∗,
(3.3)
where k1 = h1(0) < 0 (see (3.2)), and the optimal threshold is explicitly given by
a˜∗ =
ρ− µ
ρ
k1
k1 − 1
β
α
> 0. (3.4)
The firm’s optimal timing to abandon is given by the first time the value function V˜ (Xt) reaches
zero. This occurs when Xt = a˜
∗, so we have
τ˜∗a = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ a˜
∗}. (3.5)
In particular, the optimal abandonment threshold a˜∗ is slightly smaller than the ratio β/α, but
note that g(x) < 0 for x < β/α. That means that, even if the firm is currently incurring a loss, it
does not immediately abandon but will wait for the profit to improve in the future. When the price
falls further to the lower level a˜∗, then the firm will decide to abandon. The explicit expression of
a˜∗ is amenable for sensitivity analysis, which we summarize as follows.
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Corollary 3.2. The optimal threshold a˜∗ is increasing in ρ, β, and decreasing in µ, σ, α.
From Proposition 3.1, we see that V˜ (x) is increasing and becomes nearly linear when x is large
since the term xk1 (k1 < 0) diminishes to zero. In fact, it’s dominated by the linear part, even if x
is close to a˜∗ (see the proof of Corollary 3.3 in Appendix A).
Corollary 3.3. V˜ (x) is increasing convex in x. In addition, when x is sufficient large, V˜ (x) is
increasing in µ, α, and decreasing in ρ, β.
Next we turn to the optimal abandonment problem V (x). The explicit solution of V˜ (x) will
become the input to the problem for V (x). We derive the optimal threshold-type strategy. Let a∗
denote the abandonment price level before new competition arrives. New competition will bring
about a reduction in revenue for the firm, described by the fraction α. If the revenue impact is
low, then the firm will choose to stay longer in the market and exit in a lower threshold, and thus
we expect a∗ > a˜∗. In contrast, when the firm’s revenue is significantly reduced, then it is more
likely that the firm will experience a negative cash flow, and may be forced to leave the market
earlier. This means that the post-competition threshold a˜∗ is higher than the pre-competition level
a∗. As is intuitive, the aforementioned first and second cases correspond to, respectively, the large
and small values of α. As we show below, the two cases are separated by the critical value of α0,
defined by
α0 =
(
1−
ρp1(k1 − 1)(ρ+ λ2 − µ)
k1(p1 − 1)(ρ − µ)(ρ+ λ2)
(1−
K
β
)
)−1
, (3.6)
where p1 = h1(λ2) as in (3.2).
Proposition 3.4. The firm’s pre-competition optimal abandonment problem (2.3) is solved as
follows:
(I) If K ≥ β and α0 ≤ α ≤ 1, then there exists a unique a
∗ ∈ [a˜∗,+∞) such that
α(k1 − p1)
k1(ρ− µ)
(a˜∗)1−k1(a∗)k1 +
ρ+ αλ2 − µ
ρ+ λ2 − µ
p1 − 1
ρ− µ
a∗ −
p1(βλ2 + ρK)
ρ(ρ+ λ2)
= 0. (3.7)
The value function V (x) is given by
V (x) =
{
C1x
p1 − α
k1(ρ−µ)
(a˜∗)1−k1xk1 + ρ+αλ2−µ
ρ+λ2−µ
1
ρ−µx−
βλ2+ρK
ρ(ρ+λ2)
if x > a∗,
0 if 0 < x ≤ a∗.
(3.8)
(II) If K < β, or K ≥ β and 0 ≤ α < α0, then there exists a unique a
∗ ∈ (0, a˜∗) such that
(p1 − k1)ρ(ρ+ λ2 − µ) + k1µλ2(1− p1)
(1− k1)ρ(ρ+ λ2)(ρ+ λ2 − µ)
β(a˜∗)−p2(a∗)p2 +
p1 − 1
ρ+ λ2 − µ
a∗ −
p1K
ρ+ λ2
= 0. (3.9)
The value function V (x) is given by
V (x) =

C2x
p1 − α
k1(ρ−µ)
(a˜∗)1−k1xk1 + ρ+αλ2−µ
ρ+λ2−µ
1
ρ−µx−
βλ2+ρK
ρ(ρ+λ2)
if x > a˜∗,
C3x
p1 + C4x
p2 + 1
ρ+λ2−µ
x− K
ρ+λ2
if a∗ < x ≤ a˜∗,
0 if 0 < x ≤ a∗.
(3.10)
In both cases (I) and (II), the firm’s optimal abandonment time without competition is given by
τ∗a = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ a
∗}. (3.11)
6
The coefficients in above expressions are given by
C1 =
−v1(a
∗)
(a∗)p1
, (3.12)
C2 =
(p1 − k1)ρ(ρ+ λ2 − µ) + k1µλ2(1− p1)
(k1 − 1)ρ(ρ + λ2)(ρ+ λ2 − µ)
((a˜∗)p2−p1 − (a∗)p2−p1)β
(p2 − p1)(a˜∗)p1
+
v2(a˜
∗)− v1(a˜
∗)
(a˜∗)p1
−
v2(a
∗)
(a∗)p1
, (3.13)
C3 =
1
1− (a∗)p1−p2(a˜∗)p2−p1
(
C2 +
(a˜∗)p2−p1
(a∗)p2
v2(a
∗)−
v2(a˜
∗)− v1(a˜
∗)
(a˜∗)p1
)
, (3.14)
C4 = −
C3(a
∗)p1 + v2(a
∗)
(a∗)p2
, (3.15)
v1(x) = −
α
k1(ρ− µ)
(a˜∗)1−k1xk1 +
ρ+ αλ2 − µ
ρ+ λ2 − µ
1
ρ− µ
x−
βλ2 + ρK
ρ(ρ+ λ2)
, (3.16)
v2(x) =
1
ρ+ λ2 − µ
x−
K
ρ+ λ2
, and p2 = h2(λ2). (3.17)
Proposition 3.4 gives the exact conditions to determine the ordering of the thresholds a∗ and
a˜∗. As an example, let β = αK so that the post-competition profit stream g(x) be proportional to
f(x), i.e. g(x) = α(x−K). Proposition 3.4 indicates that α > α0, and thus we have a
∗ > a˜∗ in case
(II). In this example, the firm will have a smaller profit stream after the competitor’s arrival. To
compensate the reduction in profit, the firm opts to stay longer in the market with the competitor
and exit at a lower threshold.
To determine which case applies, the simple first step is to check whether K is larger than β
or not. If K < β, it falls into case (II). Otherwise, we need to check the values of the parameters
α and α0 (see (3.6)). Note if K = β, then α0 = 1, which can be seen directly from (3.6). Next,
Corollary 3.5 describes the behavior of α0 and its sensitivity in the arrival rate of competition λ2.
Corollary 3.5. Suppose K > β, then we have 0 < α0 < 1. Moreover, α0 is strictly decreasing with
respect to λ2, and it admits a limit
α∞0 := lim
λ2→+∞
α0 =
(
1 +
ρ(1− k1)
k1(ρ− µ)
(1−
K
β
)
)−1
∈ (0, 1). (3.18)
This also leads to the curious question: under what conditions does the abandonment level stay
unchanged after the competitor’s entry? From the proof of Proposition 3.4 in the Appendix, we
see that a∗ = a˜∗ if and only if K ≥ β and α = α0. As a concrete example, let β = K and α = 1,
then a∗ = a˜∗. This is intuitive since in this case the competitor’s entry does not affect the firm’s
profit stream, and thus its abandonment timing.
4 Optimal Entry Timing Problem
We now analyze the firm’s optimal entry timing problem ψ(x) defined in (2.4). Suggested by
Figure 1(a), the firm can choose to cancel the project, enter the market, or wait at anytime during
the incubation period. This leads us to determine the upper and lower thresholds, e∗ and c∗, for
entry and cancellation by the firm.
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Proposition 4.1. The firm’s optimal entry timing problem (2.4) is given by
ψ(x) =

V (x) if x ≥ e∗,
J(x) if c∗ < x < e∗,
0 if 0 < x ≤ c∗,
(4.1)
where
J(x) = D1x
q1 +D2x
q2 −
a
ρ+ λ1 − µ
x−
b
ρ+ λ1
, (4.2)
and qi = hi(λ1) as in (3.2). The constants {e
∗, c∗,D1,D2} are found from the system of equations:
D1(c
∗)q1 +D2(c
∗)q2 −
ac∗
ρ+ λ1 − µ
−
b
ρ+ λ1
= 0, (4.3)
D1q1(c
∗)q1−1 +D2q2(c
∗)q2−1 −
a
ρ+ λ1 − µ
= 0, (4.4)
D1(e
∗)q1 +D2(e
∗)q2 −
ae∗
ρ+ λ1 − µ
−
b
ρ+ λ1
= V (e∗), (4.5)
D1q1(e
∗)q1−1 +D2q2(e
∗)q2−1 −
a
ρ+ λ1 − µ
=
d
dx
V (x)|x=e∗ . (4.6)
The corresponding optimal entry and cancellation times are, respectively,
τ∗e = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ e
∗} and τ∗c = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ c
∗}. (4.7)
Remark 4.2. To our best knowledge, the above system of nonlinear equations do not admit explicit
solutions. Even in the simpler perpetual American installment call/put option problem studied in
Ciurlia and Caperdoni (2009); Kimura (2009), similar systems of equations arise and no explicit
solutions are given. Nevertheless, these equations can be solved efficiently by standard root-finding
methods, such as the Newton-Raphson method, available in many computational softwares.
The value function ψ(x) depends on the early termination risk parameter λ1 as we can see from
J(x) in (4.2) and the coefficients in (4.3)-(4.6). We observe from (4.1) that ψ(x) equals to V (x) for
x ≥ e∗. Therefore, the competition risk, which exists after the firm’s entry, has an indirect effect
on the firm’s decisions prior to entering the market since V (x), and thus e∗ and c∗, depend on λ2.
Moreover, noticing that V (x) appears in (4.3)-(4.6), a∗ enters the system of equations for e∗ and
c∗ indirectly through the value function V (x) that is tied to a∗. As a result, both e∗ and c∗ depend
on a∗.
Figure 2 shows the value functions ψ(x) and V (x), along with four thresholds c∗, a˜∗, a∗, and
e∗. From both panels, we see that ψ(x) and V (x) are both increasing in x as a higher expected net
present value is attained at a higher price level. The value function ψ(x) dominates V (x) due to the
timing option (to enter the market) embedded in ψ(x). If the firm chooses to enter immediately
at some x, then we have ψ(x) = V (x). This occurs for x ≥ e∗. By checking the condition in
Proposition 3.4, we have K = 10 > β = 7 > 0 and α0 = 0.47, and in turn, α = 0.6 > 0.47 = α0
in Figure 2(a) while α = 0.3 < 0.47 = α0 in Figure 2(b). In other words, the left and right panels
represent case (I) with a∗ ≥ a˜∗ and case (II) with a˜∗ > a∗ in Proposition 3.4 respectively.
Also, we observe that the cancellation threshold c∗ is smaller than both post-entry abandonment
thresholds a∗ and a˜∗. During the incubation period, the option to enter induces the firm to be willing
8
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Figure 2: The value functions ψ(x) and V (x) in cases (I) and (II). Left: c∗ = 1.21, a˜∗ = 3.03,
a∗ = 3.22 and e∗ = 6.66. Right: c∗ = 2.55, a˜∗ = 6.06, a∗ = 5.16 and e∗ = 10.81. Common
parameters: µ = 0.03, σ = 0.2, ρ = 0.05, a = 0.1, b = 0.1, K = 10, λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.2, β = 7,
and α = 0.6 (left), 0.3 (right).
to incur a loss in order to wait for the opportunity to enter the market. However, once the firm
has entered the market, the entry option vanishes, and the firm demands more profit to stay in the
market, and will exit at a level higher than c∗.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we examine the effects of the early termination risk and the competitor’s arrival
on the firm’s optimal strategies. Common parameters are of the same values as in Figure 2.
5.1 Early Termination
First, we conduct a sensitivity analysis of the thresholds with respect to the early termination
rate λ1. As is seen in Figure 3, the pre/post-competition abandonment levels do not change with
λ1 since the firm has already entered the market. For the entry and cancellation thresholds, we
see that e∗ decreases but c∗ increases as λ1 increases. In other words, a high early termination risk
induces the firm to enter the market early, even if that means capturing a lower profit stream upon
entry. Moreover, the firm may also cancel the project earlier because the expected profitability is
reduced by the higher termination risk. In Figure 3, we also observe that the threshold e∗ is higher
than a∗ while c∗ is lower than a∗.
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) depict the two cases a˜∗ ≤ a∗ and a˜∗ > a∗ respectively. The impact of early
termination risk is different in these two scenarios. If the competitor’s entry causes a significant
shrinkage in the firm’s profit as in case (II), then the post-competition abandonment level a˜∗ will
be higher than the pre-competition one a∗. Also, the firm’s entry level e∗ is decreasing in λ1. In
Figure 3(b), we see that e∗ will eventually fall below a˜∗ but stay above a∗. In this case, whenever
the competitor enters, the firm switches its abandonment level to the higher level a˜∗. This forces
the firm to abandon immediately involuntarily if the current value of X is below a˜∗.
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Figure 3: Sensitivity of the firm’s strategies with respect to early termination rate λ1.
5.2 Competition Risk
The risk of competition will influence the firm’s pre-competition exit strategy, described by a∗,
in a non-trivial way. We discuss the four scenarios of different sensitivities in Figure 4. In the
following discussion, we keep in mind that a˜∗ doesn’t depend on λ2 and α0 is decreasing in λ2 by
Corollary 3.5.
Figure 4(a) illustrates the first scenario withK < β. This corresponds to case (II) in Proposition
3.4, where we have shown that a∗ < a˜∗ for all λ2 > 0. In addition, a
∗ is increasing in λ2, which
means that the firm will choose to exit early under the threat of competitor’s entry.
For the remaining three scenarios in Figures 4(b)-4(d), we have K ≥ β. By Corollary 3.5, we
have 1 > α0(0) > α0(λ2) > α
∞
0 > 0 for all λ2 > 0. In Figure 4(b), a
∗ is again increasing in λ2. In
this figure, we have α ≤ α∞0 , which belongs to case (II) in Proposition 3.4, and thus a
∗ < a˜∗.
Figure 4(c) shows that a∗ is first increasing then decreasing in λ2. This is because the constant
α0 is first larger than α but then smaller than α as λ2 increases. Therefore, as λ2 increases, it
changes from case (II) to case (I) in Proposition 3.4. That explains why a∗ is smaller than a˜∗ at
first, and the relation reverses for large λ2.
Lastly, in Figure 4(d) we have α ≥ α0(0), which corresponds to case (I) in Proposition 3.4. We
have shown that a∗ ≥ a˜∗ for all λ2. In contrast to the other scenarios, the pre-competition threshold
a∗ is decreasing and approaches a˜∗ as λ2 increases. In this scenario, the impact of the competitor’s
entry on the firm’s profit is much less than in other scenarios, as indicated by the higher value of
α.
In summary, scenarios (a), (b), and the first part of scenario (c) belong to case (II), in which
the competitor’s potential entry will lead to a significant profit reduction. Therefore, the firm exits
early by selecting a higher pre-competition abandonment threshold a∗ as the competitor’s arrival
rate increases. The opposite happens to scenario (d) and the second part (large λ2) of scenario (c).
As λ2 increases, which means high risk of facing competition in the future, the firm tries to stay
longer before the competitor’s entry to make more profits in case of the potential significant loss
afterwards. This results in a decreasing pre-competition abandonment threshold a∗.
Despite different behaviors of a∗, there is a common phenomenon that a∗ approaches a˜∗ as λ2
increases. The intuitive explanation is as follows. When the competition risk is very high, the firm
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will adjust its abandonment level a∗ in order not to be affected too much when the competitor
eventually enters. That means that the firm’s abandonment level a∗ before the competitor’s entry
will be close to the post-competition abandonment level a˜∗.
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Figure 4: Sensitivity of the abandonment thresholds, a∗ (pre-competition) and a˜∗ (post-
competition), with respect to the competitor’s arrival rate λ2.
In addition to a∗, the entry and cancellation thresholds e∗ and c∗ are also affected by the
competitor’s arrival rate λ2 after the firm’s market entry. In two scenarios, Figure 5(a) and Figure
5(b) respectively take the same parameters as Figure 4(b) and Figure 4(d), so they represent
respectively case (II) and (I) in Proposition 3.4. Figure 5(a) shows that both e∗ and c∗ are increasing
in λ2 under case (II). In particular, the entry threshold e
∗ is seen to be lower than the abandonment
threshold a˜∗ when λ2 is small, but then surpasses it for large λ2. In this case, the competitor’s
arrival will lead to a significant post-entry profit reduction. Therefore, as is intuitive, the firm
requires a higher entry level to ensure a higher post-entry profit so as to make the entry worthwhile.
Nevertheless, under case (I), Figure 5(b) shows that both e∗ and c∗ are decreasing in λ2. In other
words, when the post-entry competition arrival is not expected to have a significant impact on
profit, the firm will opt to enter the market earlier at a lower entry threshold.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity of the entry and cancellation thresholds, e∗ and c∗, with respect to the
competitor’s arrival rate λ2.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a model to evaluate the timing options to enter or exit a given market for a
startup firm. Our model accounts for the risks of early termination prior to market entry, as well as
the risk of new competition that may reduce the firm’s future profit stream. Our analytic solutions
allow for instant computation of the firm’s optimal expected NPV and the associated optimal timing
strategies. We have provided explanation on the non-trivial combined effect of early termination
and competition risks on the firm’s entry and pre-competition abandonment decisions.
There are a number of directions for future research. For tractability, we have chosen to work
with a lognormal model. Alternatively, we will consider in future work other dynamics for the
underlying price process, such as jump diffusions or mean-reverting processes, such as the Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross, and exponential Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes (Leung et al. (2014), Leung et al.
(2015)). For a startup, it is also useful to choose between equity and debt financing and examine
the implications to the firm’s investment and bankruptcy decisions (see, e.g. Tian (2011)). Another
natural extension of our model is to incorporate sequential random arrivals and departures of
competitors.
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A Appendix
In this appendix, we provide the proofs of all the propositions and corollaries presented above.
A.1 Proof of Equations (2.3) and (2.4)
Recall that (Ft)t≥0 is the filtration generated by X. We re-state equation (2.3), and apply the
tower property to get
V (x) = sup
τa∈T
Ex
[∫ τa∧ζ2
0
e−ρtf (Xt) dt+ 1{τa>ζ2}e
−ρζ2 V˜ (Xζ2)
]
= sup
τa∈T
Ex
[
E
[∫ τa∧ζ2
0
e−ρtf (Xt) dt+ 1{τa>ζ2}e
−ρζ2V˜ (Xζ2)
∣∣∣Fτa]] . (A.1)
The arrival time ζ2 is exponentially distributed and independent of X, so the first term inside
the expectation (A.1) can be written as
E
[∫ τa∧ζ2
0
e−ρtf (Xt) dt
∣∣∣Fτa] = E [∫ τa
0
1{ζ2≥t}e
−ρtf (Xt) dt
∣∣∣Fτa]
= E
[∫ τa
0
(∫ +∞
t
λ2e
−λ2y dy
)
e−ρtf (Xt) dt
∣∣∣Fτa]
= E
[∫ τa
0
e−(λ2+ρ)tf (Xt) dt
∣∣∣Fτa] . (A.2)
By the same procedure, we express the second term in (A.1) as
E
[
1{τa>ζ2}e
−ρζ2 V˜ (Xζ2)
∣∣∣Fτa] = E [∫ τa
0
e−(λ2+ρ)tλ2V˜ (Xt) dt
∣∣∣Fτa] . (A.3)
Combining (A.2) and (A.3), we obtain equation (2.3). Equation (2.4) is derived in the same fashion.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. We consider a candidate stopping time τ˜a = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ a˜
∗}, where a˜∗ > 0. In the
stopping region {x < a˜∗}, V˜ (x) = 0 from the definition of τ˜a and (2.2). In the continuation region
{x ≥ a˜∗}, V˜ (x) satisfies the following ODE:
− ρV˜ (x) + µxV˜ ′(x) +
σ2x2
2
V˜ ′′(x) + g(x) = 0, (A.4)
with boundary conditions:
V˜ (a˜∗) = 0, V˜ ′(a˜∗) = 0, lim
x→∞
V˜ ′(x) <∞. (A.5)
The ODE and the last condition in (A.5) indicate that the solution is given by B1x
k1 + g0(x),
where with constants B1 and k1, such that k1 is the negative root of the associated quadratic
equation, and g0(x) is a particular solution of (A.4):
g0(x) =
αx
ρ− µ
−
β
ρ
. (A.6)
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To determine a˜∗ and B1, we utilize boundary conditions (A.5) to get the system of equations:
B1(a˜
∗)k1 +
αa˜∗
ρ− µ
+
β
ρ
= 0, (A.7)
B1k1(a˜
∗)k1−1 +
α
ρ− µ
= 0. (A.8)
The above equations yield (3.3) and (3.4) in Proposition 3.1.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 3.2
Proof. First, we define the ratio:
k1
k1 − 1
=
1 + σ2(√(σ2
2
− µ)2 + 2σ2ρ−
σ2
2
+ µ
)−1−1 . (A.9)
From (A.9) and the expression of a˜∗ in (3.4), we know that k1
k1−1
increases in ρ and thus a˜∗ increases
in ρ.
Next, we differentiate a˜∗ with respect to µ. Let δ :=
√
(σ
2
2 − µ)
2 + 2σ2ρ > |σ
2
2 − µ| ≥ 0, then
∂a˜∗
∂µ
=
−2β
α(2ρ + σ
2
2 − µ+ δ)
2
(
σ2
2
+ δ + (ρδ + (ρ− µ)(µ−
σ2
2
))δ−1
)
. (A.10)
Since ρδ > |(ρ− µ)(µ− σ
2
2 )|, we have
∂a˜∗
∂µ
< 0 and thus a˜∗ decreases with respect to µ.
In addition,
∂k1
∂σ
=
∂k1
∂(σ2)
∂(σ2)
∂σ
=
σ2
2 − µ+ δ + 2ρ
2ρ
k21σ > 0. (A.11)
Therefore k1 < 0 and
∂k1
∂σ
> 0 indicate that k1
k1−1
decreases in σ and thus a˜∗ decreases in σ.
Finally, that a˜∗ decreases in α and increases in β can be directly inferred from (3.4).
A.4 Proof of Corollary 3.3
Proof. We take the first and second derivatives of V˜ (x), namely,
V˜ ′(x) =
α
ρ− µ
(
1−
(
a˜∗
x
)1−k1)
and V˜ ′′(x) =
α(1− k1)
ρ− µ
(a˜∗)1−k1xk1−2 , ∀x > a˜∗. (A.12)
In turn, k1 < 0 implies V˜
′(x) > 0 and V˜ ′′(x) > 0 for all x > a˜∗. In addition, when x is sufficient
large, the first part of V˜ (x) is negligible and its sensitivity with respect to the parameters can be
deduced from (3.3).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.4
To prove Proposition 3.4, we first establish the following lemmas.
Lemma A.1. Let H : R+ → R such that
H(x) =
α(k1 − p1)
k1(ρ− µ)
(a˜∗)1−k1xk1 +
ρ+ αλ2 − µ
ρ+ λ2 − µ
p1 − 1
ρ− µ
x−
p1(βλ2 + ρK)
ρ(ρ+ λ2)
, (A.13)
then there exists unique a∗ ∈ [a˜∗,+∞), such that H(a∗) = 0, if and only if K ≥ β and α0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
If α = α0, then a
∗ = a˜∗.
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Proof. We take the first and second derivatives of H(x),
H ′(x) =
α(k1 − p1)
ρ− µ
(a˜∗)1−k1xk1−1 +
ρ+ αλ2 − µ
ρ+ λ2 − µ
p1 − 1
ρ− µ
, (A.14)
H ′′(x) =
α(k1 − p1)(k1 − 1)
ρ− µ
(a˜∗)1−k1xk1−2. (A.15)
Notice α > 0 and p1 < k1 < 0, then H
′′(x) < 0 for all x > 0. This means H ′(x) is a decreasing
function with respect to x. By inspection, we have
H ′(x)

> 0 if 0 < x < a∗0,
= 0 if x = a∗0,
< 0 if x > a∗0,
with a∗0 = a˜
∗
(
1− p1
α(k1 − p1)
ρ+ αλ2 − µ
ρ+ λ2 − µ
) 1
k1−1
. (A.16)
The derivative means thatH(x) is unimodal and maximized at a∗0. Moreover, we have limx→0H(x) =
limx→+∞H(x) = −∞. Note that
(
1−p1
α(k1−p1)
ρ+αλ2−µ
ρ+λ2−µ
)
is a decreasing function of α (0 < α ≤ 1).
When α = 1,
(
1−p1
α(k1−p1)
ρ+αλ2−µ
ρ+λ2−µ
)
> 1. Therefore, we see that a∗0 < a˜
∗ for all 0 < α ≤ 1.
There exists a unique a∗ such that H(a∗) = 0 and a∗ ≥ a˜∗ if and only if H(a˜∗) ≥ 0. To see this,
if there is an a∗ ≥ a˜∗ such that H(a∗) = 0, then H(a˜∗) ≥ 0, because H(x) is a decreasing function
when x > a∗0 and a
∗ ≥ a˜∗ > a∗0. On the other hand, if H(a˜
∗) ≥ 0, the existence and uniqueness
of a∗ comes from the fact that H(x) is continuous and decreasing for x > a˜∗ > a∗0, along with
limx→+∞H(x) = −∞.
Now H(a˜∗) is given by
H(a˜∗) =
β(p1 − k1)
ρ(1− k1)
+
k1β(ρ+ αλ2 − µ)(1− p1)
ρα(ρ+ λ2 − µ)(1− k1)
−
p1(βλ2 + ρK)
ρ(ρ+ λ2)
. (A.17)
It’s easy to see that H(a˜∗) is increasing in α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1), holding other parameters fixed. When
α = 1, H(a˜∗)|α=1 =
p1(β−K)
(λ2+ρ)
, which means H(a˜∗) ≤ p1(β−K)(λ2+ρ) for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
(1) If K < β, then H(a˜∗) < 0, and there is not an a∗ ≥ a˜∗ such that H(a∗) = 0.
(2) If K ≥ β, then
H(a˜∗)

> 0 if α > α0,
= 0 if α = α0,
< 0 if α < α0,
with α0 =
(
1−
ρp1(k1 − 1)(ρ+ λ2 − µ)
k1(p1 − 1)(ρ− µ)(ρ+ λ2)
(1−
K
β
)
)−1
. (A.18)
From cases (1) and (2) above, we conclude that K ≥ β and α0 ≤ α ≤ 1 iff H(a˜
∗) ≥ 0 iff there
exists a unique a∗ such that H(a∗) = 0 and a∗ ≥ a˜∗. Moreover, a∗ = a˜∗ iff K ≥ β and α = α0, due
to the uniqueness of a∗.
Lemma A.2. Let M : R+ → R such that
M(x) =
(p1 − k1)ρ(ρ+ λ2 − µ) + k1µλ2(1− p1)
(1− k1)ρ(ρ+ λ2)(ρ+ λ2 − µ)
β(a˜∗)−p2xp2 +
p1 − 1
ρ+ λ2 − µ
x−
p1K
ρ+ λ2
, (A.19)
then there exists unique a∗ ∈ (0, a˜∗), such that M(a∗) = 0, if and only if K < β, or K ≥ β and
0 ≤ α < α0.
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Proof. We take the first derivative of M(x),
M ′(x) =
(p1 − k1)ρ(ρ+ λ2 − µ) + k1µλ2(1− p1)
(1− k1)ρ(ρ+ λ2)(ρ+ λ2 − µ)
β(a˜∗)−p2p2x
p2−1 +
p1 − 1
ρ+ λ2 − µ
. (A.20)
Conditions µ > 0, p1 < k1 < 0 and p2 > 1 indicate M
′(x) < 0 for all x > 0 and thus M(x) is
a decreasing function in x. M(0) = − p1K
ρ+λ2
> 0 and limx→∞M(x) = −∞ imply that there exists
unique a∗ such that M(a∗) = 0.
Now we need to check whether a˜∗ > a∗ or not. Note a˜∗ > a∗ if and only if M(a˜∗) < 0.
M(a˜∗) =
(p1 − k1)ρ(ρ+ λ2 − µ) + k1µλ2(1− p1)
(1− k1)ρ(ρ+ λ2)(ρ+ λ2 − µ)
β +
p1 − 1
ρ+ λ2 − µ
a˜∗ −
p1K
ρ+ λ2
=
(p1 − k1)ρ(ρ+ λ2 − µ) + k1µλ2(1− p1)
(1− k1)ρ(ρ+ λ2)(ρ+ λ2 − µ)
β +
p1 − 1
ρ+ λ2 − µ
ρ− µ
ρ
k1
k1 − 1
β
α
−
p1K
ρ+ λ2
. (A.21)
It’s easy to check that M(a˜∗) = H(a˜∗) (in the proof of Lemma A.1). Follow the last part of the
proof in Lemma A.1, we immediately obtain the result of Lemma A.2.
Now let’s focus on the proof of Proposition 3.4.
Proof. We consider a candidate stopping time τa = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ a
∗}, where a∗ > 0. We split
the problem into two cases: a∗ ≥ a˜∗ and a∗ < a˜∗.
(I) We first assume a∗ ≥ a˜∗. In the stopping region {x < a∗}, V (x) = 0 from the definition τa
and (2.3). In the continuation region {x ≥ a∗}, V (x) satisfies the following ODE:
− (ρ+ λ2)V (x) + µxV
′(x) +
σ2x2
2
V ′′(x) + f(x) + λ2V˜ (x) = 0, (A.22)
with boundary conditions:
V (a∗) = 0, V ′(a∗) = 0, lim
x→∞
V ′(x) < +∞. (A.23)
The ODE and last condition in (A.23) indicate that the general solution is given by C1x
p1+v1(x),
where C1 is a constant, p1 is the negative root of the associated quadratic equation, and v1(x) is a
particular solution of (A.22):
v1(x) = −
α
k1(ρ− µ)
(a˜∗)1−k1xk1 +
ρ+ αλ2 − µ
ρ+ λ2 − µ
1
ρ− µ
x−
βλ2 + ρK
ρ(ρ+ λ2)
. (A.24)
To determine a∗ and C1, we utilize boundary conditions (A.23) to get the following system of
equations:
C1(a
∗)p1 + v1(a
∗) = 0, (A.25)
C1p1(a
∗)p1−1 + v′1(a
∗) = 0. (A.26)
The above equations yield (3.7). From Lemma A.1, if K ≥ β and α0 ≤ α ≤ 1, then there exists
unique a∗ ≥ a˜∗, satisfying (3.7). We solve a∗ numerically and plug it in (A.25) and (A.26), then
we can get (3.12) and thus (3.8).
(II) Next we assume a∗ < a˜∗. Also from the definition τa and (2.3), V (x) = 0 in the stopping
region {x < a∗}. In the continuation region {x ≥ a∗}, V (x) satisfies the following ODE:
− (ρ+ λ2)V (x) + µxV
′(x) +
σ2x2
2
V ′′(x) + f(x) + λ2V˜ (x) = 0, (A.27)
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with continuous fit and smooth-pasting conditions:
V (2)(a∗) = 0, V ′(2)(a∗) = 0, V (1)(a˜∗) = V (2)(a˜∗), (A.28)
V ′(1)(a˜∗) = V ′(2)(a˜∗), lim
x→∞
V ′(1)(x) < +∞. (A.29)
Since V˜ (x) is a piecewise function, the general solution is also a piecewise function,
V (x) =

V (1)(x) if x > a˜∗,
V (2)(x) if a∗ < x < a˜∗,
0 if 0 < x < a∗,
(A.30)
where
V (1)(x) = C2x
p1 + v1(x), (A.31)
V (2)(x) = C3x
p1 + C4x
p2 + v2(x). (A.32)
The constants C2 to C4 are determined by (A.29), and p1 and p2 are the two roots of the quadratic
equation: −(ρ+ λ2) + µp + σ
2p(p − 1)/2 = 0. In (A.31) and (A.32), the particular solution v1(x)
is given by (A.24), and
v2(x) =
1
ρ+ λ2 − µ
x−
K
ρ+ λ2
. (A.33)
To determine a∗, C2, C3, and C4, we refer to (A.29) to get the following system of equations:
C3(a
∗)p1 + C4(a
∗)p2 + v2(a
∗) = 0, (A.34)
C3p1(a
∗)p1−1 + C4p2(a
∗)p2−1 + v′2(a
∗) = 0, (A.35)
C3(a˜
∗)p1 + C4(a˜
∗)p2 + v2(a˜
∗) = C2(a˜
∗)p1 + v1(a˜
∗), (A.36)
C3p1(a˜
∗)p1−1 + C4p2(a˜
∗)p2−1 + v′2(a˜
∗) = C2p1(a˜
∗)p1−1 + v′1(a˜
∗). (A.37)
Solving the above equations, we obtain C2 to C4 as in (3.13)-(3.15), and a
∗ satisfies (3.9). From
Lemma A.2, if K < β, or K ≥ β and 0 ≤ α < α0, then there exists a unique a
∗ < a˜∗ that satisfies
(3.9).
A.6 Proof of Corollary 3.5
Proof. First, recall that k1, p1 < 0 and ρ > µ, which after some algebra implies that 0 < α0 ≤ 1
(see (3.6)). We rewrite α0 in the following form
α0 =
k1(p1 − 1)(ρ− µ)(ρ+ λ2)
k1(p1 − 1)(ρ− µ)(ρ+ λ2)− ρp1(k1 − 1)(ρ+ λ2 − µ)(1−
K
β
)
(A.38)
=
λ2S1(p1) + S2(p1)
λ2S3(p1) + S4(p1)
, (A.39)
where
S1(p1) = k1(ρ− µ)(p1 − 1),
S2(p1) = ρS1(p1),
S3(p1) = S1(p1)− ρ(k1 − 1)(1 −
K
β
)p1,
S4(p1) = S2(p1) + (ρ− µ)(S3(p1)− S1(p1)),
(A.40)
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and λ2S3(p1) + S4(p1) > 0 under the condition K > β. Since p1 depends on λ2, we differentiate to
get
∂S1(p1)
∂λ2
= k1(ρ− µ)
∂p1
λ2
,
∂S2(p1)
∂λ2
= ρ∂S1(p1)
∂λ2
,
∂S3(p1)
∂λ2
= ∂S1(p1)
∂λ2
− ρ(k1 − 1)(1−
K
β
)∂p1
λ2
,
∂S4(p1)
∂λ2
= ∂S2(p1)
∂λ2
+ (ρ− µ)(∂S3(p1)
∂λ2
− ∂S1(p1)
∂λ2
),
(A.41)
where
∂p1
λ2
= −
(
(
σ2
2
− µ)2 + 2σ2(ρ+ λ2)
)− 1
2
< 0. (A.42)
In turn, the partial derivative of α0 in λ2 is given by
∂α0
∂λ2
=
(
(λ2
∂S1
∂λ2
+ S1 +
∂S2
∂λ2
)(λ2S3 + S4)− (λ2
∂S3
∂λ2
+ S3 +
∂S4
∂λ2
)(λ2S1 + S2)
)
1
(λ2S3 + S4)
2 ,
(A.43)
where Si ≡ Si(p1), for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. Since (λ2S3 + S4)
2 > 0, we omit last term in the following
calculation,
∂α0
∂λ2
= (
∂S1
∂λ2
S3−
∂S3
∂λ2
S1)λ
2
2+(
∂S1
∂λ2
S4−
∂S4
∂λ2
S1+
∂S2
∂λ2
S3−
∂S3
∂λ2
S2)λ2+
∂S2
∂λ2
S4−
∂S4
∂λ2
S2+S1S4−S2S3.
(A.44)
With (A.40) and (A.41), we get the final result,
∂α0
∂λ2
= (1−
K
β
)k1ρ(1− k1)(ρ− µ)
(
(λ2 + ρ)(λ2 + ρ− µ)
∂p1
λ2
+ p1µ(1− p1)
)
. (A.45)
From (A.42), we see that ∂α0
∂λ2
in (A.45) is strictly negative for all λ2 > 0 under the condition K > β.
Since α0 is decreasing in λ2 and bounded below by zero, α0 must converge. Notice that
Si(p1)(1 ≤ i ≤ 4) are all linear function of p1. Hence, we have
lim
λ2→+∞
α0 = lim
λ2→+∞
λ2S1(p1) + S2(p1)
λ2S3(p1) + S4(p1)
(A.46)
= lim
p1→−∞
(
1 +
p1ρ(1− k1)
(p1 − 1)k1(ρ− µ)
(1−
K
β
)
)−1
(A.47)
=
(
1 +
ρ(1− k1)
k1(ρ− µ)
(1−
K
β
)
)−1
. (A.48)
This validates (3.18), and 0 < α0 < 1 implies that 0 < α
∞
0 ≤ 1. The equality α
∞
0 = 1 iff K = β by
(3.18).
A.7 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. We consider two candidate stopping times τe = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ e
∗} and τc = inf{t ≥ 0 :
Xt ≤ c
∗}, where e∗ ≥ c∗ > 0. In the entry region {x > e∗}, the firm enters the market and thus
ψ(x) = V (x). In the cancellation region {x < c∗}, we have ψ(x) = 0. In the continuation region,
c∗ ≤ x ≤ e∗, where the firm waits for entry or cancellation, the firm’s value function ψ(x) satisfies
the ODE:
− (ρ+ λ1)ψ(x) + µxψ
′(x) +
σ2x2
2
ψ′′(x)− c(x) = 0, (A.49)
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with the boundary conditions:
ψ(c∗) = 0, ψ′(c∗) = 0, ψ(e∗) = V (e∗), ψ′(e∗) = V ′(e∗). (A.50)
The general solution of the above ODE is given by ψ(x) = D1x
q1 +D2x
q2 + c0(x), where q1 and
q2 are roots of the quadratic equation: −(ρ + λ1) + µq + σ
2q(q − 1)/2 = 0, and c0(x) is a linear
particular solution of (A.49):
c0(x) = −
a
ρ+ λ1 − µ
x−
b
ρ+ λ1
. (A.51)
To determine c∗ and e∗, along with the constants D1 and D2, we apply the conditions in (A.50) to
obtain the system of equations (4.3)-(4.6).
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